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TORTS
GEORGE SAVAGE KING*
For convenience the cases covered in this review will be
grouped under five headings. None of this year's cases can
be said to have introduced any novel principles, though the
Supreme Court did take advantage of the opportunity pre-
sented in the case of Howle v. McDaniel' to declare that this
state recognizes the well established general rule2 that the
negligence of a bailee is not imputed to the bailor.
Perhaps particular attention should be paid to A.C.L. Rail-
road Co. 'v. Truett3 decided by the Court of Appeals, Fourth
Circuit. Its significance lies not in the decision but in the
following inadvertent misstatement of the South Carolina law
on imputed negligence: "As to the question of the parents'
contributory negligence, which under South Carolina law
would be imputed to the child, this too was a jury question."
'4
[Emphasis added.]
Ever since the case of Watson v. Southern Ry.,5 decided in
1903, it has been the law in South Carolina that the negli-
gence of a parent is not imputed to the child, and Mr. Justice
Jones speaking for the Court expressed condemnation of the
contrary rule in the following language:
The view opposed violates all our conceptions of justice
and of those principles of the common law which protect
the innocent from the guilty, which has tender regard
for the rights and safety of the helpless, which will not
excuse negligence merely because it cooperates with other
actionable negligence in working injury to one without
fault.(
This rule has been frequently reiterated by our Supreme
Court, with two cases as recent as 1950.7
*Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. 232 S. C. 125, 101 S. E. 2d 255 (1957). See also 10 S. C. L. Q. 515
for a more extended discussion of this case
2. PRossER, TORTS, 302 (2d ed. 1955). RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 489
(1934).
3. 249 F. 2d 215 (4th Cir. 1957).
4. Id. p. 218.
5. 66 S. C. 47, 44 S. E. 375 (1903).
6. Id. p. 51.
7. Limehouse v. Southern Railway Co., 216 S. C. 424, 58 S. E. 2d 685
(1950) ; Daniels v. Timmons, 216 S. C. 539, 59 S. E. 2d 149 (1950).
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In the Truett case, supra, the 18 months old son of the plain-
tiff was killed by defendant's train when he wandered onto
the tracks and the father brought this action under Lord
Campbell's Act to recover for the death. Among the defenses
raised by the railroad was the contributory negligence of the
parents in not keeping the child in custody, and the Court was
entirely correct in saying ".... the parents' contributory negli-
gence ... was a jury question," implying that a finding of
negligence would have barred a recovery. But there is no
need for the negligence to be imputed to the decedent to bar
recovery by negligent beneficiaries.
The adoption of the rule imputing the negligence of the
parent to the child would bar all actions arising out of the
negligent injury or death of the child, including those of the
child himself when he survived. The distinction between the
situations was discussed by Mr. Justice Cothran in the case
of Cirsosky v. Smatthers,8 and illustrated by the case of Horne
v. A.C.L. Railroad Co." in which the father's negligence
barred him from recovering for the death of his child, but
did not bar the non-negligent mother, both of which were
cited by the Court of Appeals following the quotation under
discussion. Because of the citations given by the Court there
can be no doubt but what the misstated parenthetical clause
was inadvertent. Nevertheless, the error cannot be allowed
to go unnoticed because such remarks of the courts have a
way of finding themselves into the digests and turning up
as authority for general statements of the law. In fact the
syllabus on the point reads: "Under South Carolina law,
parents' contributory negligence would be imputed to 18
month-old child which was struck by train at crossing."'10
1. NEGLIGENCE
(a) Sudden Emergency
Three cases this year fall within the "sudden emergency"
doctrine.
In one of these, Critzer v. Kerlin,"- there was no mention of
a sudden emergency in those words, but the defendant was
suddenly confronted with a small child running in front of
him from between parked cars and stopped "in less than the
8. 128 S. C. 358, 122 S. E. 864 (1924).
9. 177 S. C. 461, 181 S. E. 642 (1935).
10. 249 F. 2d 215, 216 (4th Cir. 1957).
11. 231 S. C. 315, 98 S. E. 2d 761 (1957).
[Vol. 11
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hood length of the car". Clearly the sudden emergency doc-
trine would apply, and the Supreme Court held that the evi-
dence was not susceptible of any inference of negligence and
the defendant was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
In Melton v. Rith&. 2 the Supreme Court reversed a directed
verdict for the defendant, holding that it was for the jury
to decide whether the defendant acted reasonably in remain-
ing as long as he did in his traffic lane while plaintiff's truck
was approaching from the opposite direction followed by two
autos racing more or less abreast, or in finally turning into
plaintiff's oncoming truck as the lesser of the evils confront-
ing him. No doubt one confronted with oncoming vehicles in
both traffic lanes is faced with a dilemma. But where there
was evidence, as here, that defendant's passenger had twice
warned him of the impending peril, and he had a wide shoulder
on the right of the highway onto which he could have turned, it
could hardly be said as a matter of law that he was justified
in turning into the left lane and colliding with plaintiff. To
claim the benefits of the sudden emergency doctrine one must
not have brought on the emergency.
In Green v. Sparks 3 the Court affirmed the submission of
the case to the jury when plaintiff ran off the highway on a
curve to avoid colliding with defendant who backed out into
the highway from a driveway on the curve, saying plaintiff
was confronted with a sudden emergency. The case was re-
versed for a new trial, however, to determine whether plain-
tiff had ratified a release he had given to defendant while
he was in the hospital.
(b) Contributory Negligence
Of the four cases under this heading only one was reversed
on appeal, and that was the one in which the trial judge had
directed a verdict for defendant, Chesser v. Taylor.14 In that
case plaintiff was working between defendant's truck and
another which were parked back to back at the State Farmers'
Market, when defendant's truck suddenly backed up crush-
ing him against the back of the other truck. Defendant knew
plaintiff was there but gave no warning that he was going
to back up. It was held that there was sufficient evidence to
12. 231 S. C. 146, 97 S. E. 2d 509 (1957).
13. 232 S. C. 414, 102 S. E. 2d 435 (1958).
14. 232 S. C. 46, 100 S. E. 2d 540 (1957).
1958]
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go to the jury on the question of negligence and contributory
negligence.
In Jeffers v. Hardeman,'15 a verdict for the plaintiff driver
of a truck and his passenger who were injured as a result of
a collision with the rear end of defendant's auto which had
stopped in the traffic lane ahead of plaintiff without any im-
pelling reason and when it could have pulled off on the
shoulder, was affirmed.
In A.C.L. Railroad Co. v. Truett,0 discussed above, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the jury's finding for the plain-
tiff when plaintiff's 18 month-old son was killed by defend-
ant's train after the engineer had seen something on the track
which he thought to be a dog, but, too late, discovered was
a child.
Judgment for the defendant given by the district judge
sitting without a jury was affirmed in Westley v. Southern
Railway Co.,"' in which plaintiff's leg had been amputated
as a result of a collision with defendant's train at a crossing
when it was raining and still dark in the early morning.
In affirming, the Court of Appeals observed:
Whether or not one shares the District Judge's view
that the circumstances compel a finding of gross con-
tributory negligence, it is not to be doubted that they
permit such a finding by the tribunal chosen by the
parties.18
(c) Duty Owed to Persons on Defendant's Premises
In Bailes v. Southern Railway Co.,19 plaintiff's intestate
was killed by defendant's train when passing through a popu-
lated area within the limits of a town and with a footpath
along the right of way. In answer to defendant's contention
that it had breached no duty owed to the decedent because he
was a trespasser, although the engineer had testified that he
had not slowed down when he saw an object on the track
ahead because he thought it was a fertilizer sack, the Court
quoted the following language from Sentell v. Southern Ry. :20
It makes no difference if the trend of the testimony
was that Sentell was a naked trespasser, the defendant
15. 231 S. C. 578, 99 S. E. 2d 402 (1957).
16. 249 F. 2d 215 (4th Cir. 1957).
17. 250 F. 2d 188 (4th Cir. 1957).
18. Id. p. 191.
19. 231 S. C. 474, 99 S. E. 2d 195 (1957).
20. 70 S. C. 183, 49 S. E. 215, 217 (1904).
[Vol. 11144
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owed him a duty, viz., that he should not be treated by
defendant without some regard to the dictates of hu-
manity. There was positive testimony that the engineer
could have seen Mr. Sentell in plenty of time to have
stopped the train before reaching him, thus have saved
his life. All in all there was testimony tending to show
negligence.
2'
That an owner of a racetrack who invites the public to
watch performances upon payment of an admission fee owes
a duty comparable to that of a merchant to his customer was
declared by the Supreme Court in the case of Taylor v.
Hardee :22
He is not an insurer of safety but does owe the duty
to keep his premises free of defects of which he knows,
or, in the exercise of reasonable care and providence,
should have known or foreseen.
22a
The Chief Justice took the occasion to offer a word of warn-
ing to those who operate riding devices such as ferris wheels,
merry-go-rounds, or the like, although none was involved in
this case:
... a different and more stringent rule of liability, akin
to that of carrier to passenger, appears to exist in the
case of [such] operators .... 23
In Hunter v. Dixie Home Stores,24 the Court reversed a
judgment for plaintiff who had fallen after slipping on a
green bean on the floor in defendant's self service food store
and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of de-
fendant. The Court found the evidence of negligence by de-
fendant insufficient to support a verdict. There was no evi-
dence to show that defendant had actual knowledge of the
bean's presence on the floor, nor to show that it had been
there long enough to charge defendant with constructive
knowledge. The rule stated in Anderson v. Belk-Robinson 5
was reiterated with the following quotation:
In Bradford v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 141 S. C. 453, 140
S. E. 105, we laid down the rule, deduced from the
weight of authority, that a merchant who invites the pub-
21. 231 S. C. 474, 481, 99 S. E. 2d 195 (1957).
22. 232 S. G. 338, 102 S. E. 2d 218 (1958).
22a. Id. p. 344.
23. Id. p. 345.
24. 232 S. C. 139, 101 S. E. 2d 262 (1957).
25. 192 S. C. 132, 5 S. E. 2d 732 (1939).
1451958]
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lie to his premises is not an insurer of the safety of his
patrons, and is therefore not liable for injuries caused
by some defect in the premises, in the absence of any
evidence tending to show that he or his agents knew or
should have known, by the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence, of the defect. This principle was re-affirmed in
Pope v. Carolina Theater, 172 S. C. 161, 173 S. E. 305;
Perry v. Carolina Theater, 180 S. C. 130, 185 S. E. 184.20
Although the above rule is followed in numerous other
states, as was pointed out by the Court, it may be asked: Is
the view expressed by the following excerpt from a special
concurring opinion by Justice Terrell of the Florida Supreme
Court 27 a forecast of things to come?
It is admitted that appellee slipped on a green bean
and fell while she was a customer in defendant's store.
The evidence shows that the accident occurred about
11:30 A.M., that the floor had been swept about fifteen
minutes before, that appellant had no knowledge of the
bean on the floor or how long it had been there before
the plaintiff's fall. Appellant contends that under such
circumstances, it is not the insurer of the safety of its
customers but is required to exercise reasonable care
only to see that the premises are kept in safe condition.
It is further contended that the trial court recognized
this to be the rule and instructed the jury accordingly.
Reasonable care was without question the rule govern-
ing stores and many other business places in the old day
when the proprietor had his breakfast by candle light
and tailored his place of business, and had it ready for
customers before sun up. Such was the store that gener-
ated the reasonable care rule, it was a general merchan-
dising establishment, the food section occupied space in
the rear and the invoice consisted of a cracker barrel,
a box.of white bacon, a few barrels of flour and sacks
of water ground meal, a hogshead of sugar, several cases
of can goods, a few caddies of plug tobacco, a barrel of
kerosene, several boxes of barber pole candy, some car-
tons of snuff, spices, salt, soda, fresh meats on Saturday
and green groceries according to the season. Trace chains,
horse collars, back bands and plow handles often got
mixed up with the groceries. Nothing was screened, the
26. Id. p. 733.
27. Carl's Markets, Inc. v. De Feo, 55 So. 2d 182, 183 (Fla. 1951).
[Vol. 11
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house fly was everywhere in evidence and the germ
theory was in the future. There was an accommodating
yokel dressed in jean trousers and a hickory shirt to serve
the customer. The floors were of rough boards, Pop pur-
chased the family groceries and wore shoes that did not
turn easily. The customers came in singles, took their
turn with the clerk and the store was kept open till bed
time and longer if those who came wanted to discuss the
fate of the nation around the cracker barrel.
The modern food store of the self serving super market
variety is a very different institution. It is said to have
had its origin about 90 years ago when George H. Hart-
ford organized the first unit in Manhattan, out of which
came the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company. In
1936 it commenced self service supermarketing in foods
and other household articles and now has more than 4500
stores doing more than three billion dollars of business
per year. Some of the other large self serving chains are
Safeway, Kroger and First National. Piggly Wiggly,
Hinke and Pillot, Big Bear, Food Fair, American Stores
and dozens of others are among the independent and
smaller chains. Some of them have developed into onestop
trading centers where the housewife not only buys the
groceries for the week but she may purchase many other
articles used in the home. She can get her hair marcelled
and her husband can go along and get a shave and a
hair cut.
The indicia of the modern self serving food store is the
basket cart, self service, volume sales, minimum prices,
showmanship, large and frequent turnover, small net
profit, unique arrangement, color scheme attraction, Fri-
day and Saturday specials, circus stunts in some places,
and many other attractions. Some one has defined it as
a combination of brilliant showmanship and the world's
most modern distribution techniques. It makes the best
use of color therapy to arrest the attention. Some of them
provide rest facilities and nurseries, put on family nights
and have reduced the wrapping problem to a minimum.
They are open from eight A.M. to six P.M., they sell more
than fifty per cent of the foods consumed in the country,
they are replacing the old style retail store and new ones
are springing up daily. They are frequented by hundreds
1958]
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and thousands of customers every day, the mural attrac-
tions and food displays are often spectacular and so con-
suming that it is said that they break down purchase
resistance and encourage impulse buying. The floors are
of synthetics or some species of composition tile, they are
smooth and much easier to trip on than the board floors
of the old store.
Nothing said here is in criticism of the self serving
food store as an institution. It is a typical product of
American ingenuity. It has revolutionized food merchan-
dising, made it cleaner and more sanitary, it has installed
screens, refrigeration and other devices to preserve per-
ishables and the people are committed to it. It dispenses
thousands of items that were unknown to the old grocery
store. It merits the place it has made in the economy of
the country but I think it has brought with it potential
hazards to the customer that it cannot dodge responsi-
bility for. I think these hazards lurk in the complete en-
vironmental differences between the two classes of food
stores, the difference in service, the difference in cus-
tomers, the difference in volume, the difference in floors,
the difference in glamour and in addition to these and
others but by no means the least of them, the self service
store has dispensed with Pop and enthroned Mom as the
family purchasing agent. She came in straps, pumps and
high heels that turn readily on composition floors if a
bean or other inducement is dropped in the way. Mom is
not the athlete that Pop is, and hasn't the capacity to
retrieve herself in a fall that Pop has. In fact, a tumble
on the floor is one extremity in which Pop is more re-
sourceful than Mom.
In view of these factors I think something more spe-
cific than the reasonable care rule must be imposed on
the proprietor of the self serving grocery store. In fact,
I think that in the light of the disparity between the
modern food market and the old time grocery, it is out
of the question to contend that they are governed by the
same rule of care. They are so different in every essen-
tial aspect that I think it would be as reasonable to con-
tend that the proprietor of a horse drawn vehicle would
be governed by the same rule of care as the proprietor
of a motor driven vehicle. The reasonable care rule may
[Vol. 1i
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still be appropriate to some factual situations but since
the judgments of men as to values now vary as the size
of their shirts and shoes, it is antiquated and has no ap-
plication to a case like this. If reasonable care can be
construed to relieve one, the phrase is so flexible that
negligence would rarely be fastened on the defendant.
Rules of conduct governing a business are not rules of
statute that the legislature is expected to promulgate,
they are rules of reason that emanate from the court
and which the court is expected to keep current. At one
time they would have been designated rules of the com-
mon law which were also court made. They are essential
to promote human progress and should square with
changing social and economic conditions. To "burn in-
cense" to an antiquated rule in a case like this, in my
judgment, amounts to inexcusable lag in judicial ad-
ministration.
The basket cart of the self serving store provides a
seat to carry the baby. At the time Mrs. DeFeo was in-
jured she was carrying her baby and collecting the family
groceries. She had traded at Carl's Markets many times,
she was perfectly familiar with the layout, she had a
right to assume that the floors were clean. The dominant
atmosphere of the self serving store reflects cleanliness.
Dirt is an abomination to it. There was no reason for her
to suspect a green bean or other object on the floor. In
fact, I do not think that under the circumstances she was
charged with looking for such impediments. This court
is committed to the doctrine that the degree of care re-
quired of the operator of any business must be commen-
surate with the kind and danger of the business he is
engaged in. I think this rule should govern the case at bar.
In Wells v. Palm Beach Kennel Club, 160 Fla. 502, 35
So. 2d 720, we rejected the reasonable care rule which
appellant seeks to invoke in this case for reason not
materially different. True the patron in that case slipped
on a bottle in the aisle of the grand stand at a race course.
It was not shown how long the bottle had been there, but
we held that the diligence required of the proprietor must
be comparable to that necessary under the circumstances
to prevent accidents. In this case the evidence shows a
complete lack of that degree of care, not alone in looking
1958]
9
King: Torts
Published by Scholar Commons, 1958
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
after the floors, but in the construction of the vegetable
bins. It is shown that the vegetable bins were overfilled
and it is admitted that the bean might have been on the
floor at least fifteen minutes at a busy time of the day.
Moone v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., Mo. App., 148
S. W. 2d 628; Pabst v. Hillman's, 293 Ill. App. 547, 13
N. E. 2d 77; Wells v. Palm Beach Kennel Club, supra. In
these and many other cases the court rejected the con-
tention that liability turns on proof that the bean or
other substance had been on the floor long enough to put
the defendant on notice. Given any other interpretation
the rule becomes shop worn and the law "goes to seed."
Deserving of only passing notice is the case of Mullen v.
Winn-Dixie Stores,28 decided by the United States Court of
Appeals, Fourth Circuit, in which judgment for the defend-
ant non obstante veredicto, was affirmed. Plaintiff had fallen
in defendant's self service store after slipping on a grape or
something similar on the floor. The Court followed the South
Carolina law as stated in Hunter v. Dixie Home Stores, supra.
2. GUEST STATUTE
Three cases involving the guest statute were decided during
the period under consideration: two by our Supreme Court
and one by the Court of Appeals. In all three, judgments for
the plaintiffs on verdicts were affirmed. In Benton v. Pellum20
the Court found there was evidence to support the reckless-
ness necessary to impose liability under the statute. There
was conflicting testimony estimating defendant's speed from
40 to 100 m.p.h. just before he collided with another car which
had stalled in the highway at 11 o'clock at night.
Defendant's conduct in driving at high speed on a very hot
day in his heavily loaded truck on a tire known to be very
weak and resulting in its blowing out and overturning the
truck withi consequent injuries to the plaintiff guest was held
to be sufficient evidence of recklessness or heedlessness to
overcome the burden of the guest statute in Saxon v. Saxon.30
28. 252 F. 2d 232 (4th Cir. 1958). Although the Court refers to the
plaintiff customer (at p. 233) as a "licensee", it would seem clear that
under the South Carolina cases he is regarded as an "invitee". E.g.,
Blease, J. concurring at p. 459 in Bradford v. F. W. Woolworth, 141
S. C. 453 (1957): "...Where the relationship was that of owner of a
public store and his invitec." [Emphasis added.]
29. 232 S. C. 26, 100 S. E. 2d 534 (1957).
30. 231 S. C. 378, 98 S. E. 2d 803 (1957).
[Vol. 11
10
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1958], Art. 22
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol11/iss1/22
SURVEY OF SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
The Court acknowledged that the mere fact of a tire's blow-
ing out is not sufficient, but when coupled with defendant's
knowledge of its weakness, his driving at high speed and with
a heavy load that shifted from time to time, the evidence was
sufficient to support the verdict. Defendant also contended
that the jury's failure to find punitive damages "absolved de-
fendant from wilfulness, wantonness or recklessness, without
proof of which there can be no recovery under the guest
statute." To this the Court answered,
... We do not think that the verdict should be so inter-
preted.
..... When the jury awarded $5,000 for actual dam-
ages, they exhausted the demand of the complaint and
there was no room for additional, punitive damages. 31
The Court of Appeals held in Hardigg v. Inglett3 2 that a
single escapade of "outrageous recklessness" earlier in the
evening which was shown to be completely out of character
for the twenty-year-old defendant, was not sufficient to
charge the guest with the same degree of heedlessness or
recklessness as defendant, as a matter of law, when the guest
voluntarily rode again with defendant resulting in the guest's
death. It was pointed out that decedent was a close friend and
frequent companion of the defendant and knew of his proven
habit of driving with care and the inference could be drawn
that decedent had expected his host to drive in his accus-
tomed manner on the fatal trip, rather than heedlessly and
recklessly as he did.
3. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
Elletson v. Dixie Home Stores33 again illustrates how dan-
gerous it may be for merchants to undertake to stop suspected
shoplifters. The risk of liability for false imprisonment, slan-
der, or malicious prosecution is very great indeed. Even
though the new shoplifting statute enacted by the Legislature
in 195634 was not applicable in this case, there is no reason
to believe that the results would have been any different with
the aid of the statute.
Plaintiff's judgment for $10,000, on a verdict for $7,000
actual and $3,000 punitive damages, was affirmed in an
31. Id. p. 809.
32. 232 S. C. 94, 101 S. E. 2d 269 (1957).
33. 231 S. C. 565, 99 S. E. 2d 384 (1957).
34. CoDn o] LAws OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952, Suppl. 1957, § 16-359.1
et seq.
19581
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opinion reiterating that the question of probable cause is one
for the jury.
Plaintiff was an elderly man of good reputation who had
been a regular customer of defendant's self service store and
failed to pay for a jar of coffee which he put into his pocket
while carrying some other items in a box. When accosted by
defendant's manager after going through the check out coun-
ter, his offer to pay for the coffee was refused, and plaintiff
was escorted to the store room of the store by the manager
who called the police and told them to "take him in". Plain-
tiff was subsequently acquitted on trial in the Municipal Court.
4. FRAUD
When the real estate agents handling the sale of a home
undertook to represent to the plaintiff purchaser the balances
of the outstanding mortgages which he assumed in the trans-
action, they were under a duty not to mislead him. Judgment
for plaintiff for the difference between the balances outstand-
ing and the amounts represented was affirmed in Lawlor v.
Scheper.35 The fact that defendants had mistakenly believed
the representation to be true did not relieve them of liability
when they professed to have knowledge of the facts stated.
The misrepresentation in this type of case exists in the repre-
sentation that one has knowledge of a fact, which is readily
ascertainable, when actually he does not have such knowledge.
5. DEFAMATION
The only point involved in the case of McClain v. Altmana'
on this appeal was whether the complaint included an allega-
tion of publication of the alleged libel by the defendants. De-
fendants were job printers who had allegedly printed posters
used against plaintiff in a political race for his re-election as
Sheriff of Anderson County. On appeal the Supreme Court
affirmed the overruling of defendant's demurrer stating,
It id axiomatic for the purpose of demurrer that all
allegations of the complaint must be taken as true; and
when so considered, it clearly alleges that each of the
Appellants "combined and conspired" in printing or al-
lowing to be printed the alleged libelous placards or pos-
ters which by their very nature could have been intended
for no purpose other than publication, thereby contrib-
35. 232 S. C. 94, 101 S. E. 2d 269 (1957).
36. 231 S. C. 251, 98 S. E. 2d 263 (1957).
[Vol. 11
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uting to the chain of circumstances culminating in the
alleged libel, Nunnamaker v. Smith's, 96 S. C. 294, 80
S. E. 465.37
Without challenging the validity of the conclusion of the
Court under the facts alleged in this case, it appears that the
cited case of Nunnamaker v. Smith's, supra, is no authority
for the conclusion. The latter did not involve libel, there was
no doubt as to publication, nor was a conspiracy alleged. It
was a slander case in which defendant's demurrer on the
following four grounds was overruled:
1. That the complaint alleged a joint liability against
two persons.
2. That the language is not actionable per se and there
is no allegation of special damage.
3. That there is no allegation that the charge is false.
4. That there is no allegation of any fact that the
defendant by the words alleged to have been used by them
meant to impute to the plaintiff the commission of some
criminal offense involving moral turpitude, for which
the plaintiff, if charged, if the charge were true, might
have been indicted.38
The appeal was on exceptions to the overruling of the de-
murrer. The "joint liability" complained of in the first ground
was that of the corporation and its agent. The Court stated:
Where a wrong complained of is done by a corporation
which can act only through an agent, then the wrongful
act is the joint act of the corporation and the agent, and
both may be sued in one action.
39
Though neither Appellant nor Respondent cited the Nunna-
maker case in their briefs, it was cited by the Circuit Court
in the Order Passing Upon Demurrer as follows:
As a general rule of law an action for libel may not
be brought against more than one defendant but where
conspiracy is alleged it may be brought against more
than one person in the same complaint. Nunnamaker v.
Smith's, 96 S. C. 294, 80 S. E. 465.40
It should be noted that the first clause in this statement
is not in accord with the case of Connelly v. State Co.; 41 and,
37. Id. p. 266.
38. 96 S. C. 294, 297, 80 S. E. 465 (1913).
39. Id.
40. Transcript of Record, p. 10.
41. 152 S. C. 1, 149 S. B. 266 (1929).
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as stated earlier, the Nunnamaker case involved neither libel
nor conspiracy.
Perhaps this case will serve to prove to the writer's students
the value of his repeated admonitions to go back to the cases
cited and read them and refuse to accept someone else's cita-
tion of it. E.g., West's S. C. Digest includes the following:
An action for slander cannot be maintained against
two or more persons jointly unless the slander is the
result of a conspiracy-Nunnamaker v. Smith's, 80 S. E.
465, 96 S. C. 294.42
Yet again, there is no reference in the Nunnamaker case
to any conspiracy. Undoubtedly, the citation of Connefly 'V.
State Co.43 by respondent's counsel would have given the
Court the assistance which it has a right to expect of its
attorneys.
The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, in the
ease of Tedder v. Merchants and Manufacturers Ins. Co.
44
reversed a judgment non obstante veredicto for defendant
and sent it back with instructions to enter judgment for the
plaintiff on the jury's verdict. Plaintiff brought suit for
slander allegedly committed by defendant's adjuster in the
settlement of a fire insurance claim. The trial court had found
that the adjuster was not acting within the scope of his
authority when he made the defamatory remarks. After re-
viewing the evidence in detail the Court of Appeals held that
the evidence was sufficient to go to the jury, stating: "It is
clear that the business entrusted to the adjuster brought about
the occasion for the slanderous remarks." 45 The defamation
had taken place in the adjuster's office during a conversation
between the adjuster and plaintiff's co-owner of the tobacco
which had been destroyed, while discussing the settlement of
the loss.
42. Vol. 13, Libel and Slander, Key 74.
43. Supra, note 41-
44. 251 F. 2d 250 (4th Cir. 1958).
45. Id. p. 253.
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